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S/1996/170
6 March 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 MARCH 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijani Republic issued on 5 March 1996 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Eldar KOULIEV
Permanent Representative

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Annex

[Original: Russian]

Statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijani Republic

On 1 March 1996 the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia signed an agreement "on cooperation and coordination" with the illegal entity that has been established in the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic which is occupied by the Republic of Armenia.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijani Republic considers it necessary to make the following statement concerning the signing of the above-mentioned agreement.

During the eight long years of aggression by the Republic of Armenia against the Azerbaijani Republic, Armenia has pursued a deliberate policy of seizing the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic by force and annexing it to the Republic of Armenia.

Notwithstanding the decisions of the United Nations and the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) which have unambiguously identified Armenia as a party to the armed conflict, the Republic of Armenia continues to affirm to the world community that it is not involved in the conflict. In reality, however, the actions of the Republic of Armenia have encouraged separatism in the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic, afforded material, financial and military support for the illegal armed groups in Nagorny Karabakh, and hence signify its direct involvement in military actions in the territory of Azerbaijan that have resulted in the occupation by the Republic of Armenia of 20 per cent of Azerbaijan's territory and the emergence of nearly a million refugees and displaced persons.

To date the Republic of Armenia has not rescinded the decisions of its parliament concerning the annexation of the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic and the non-recognition of any document that would stipulate that Nagorny Karabakh belongs to the Azerbaijani Republic. What is more, in proclaiming its sovereignty, the Republic of Armenia illegally included the territory of the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic in its Declaration of Sovereignty.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijani Republic declares that the recent step taken by the Republic of Armenia in signing the aforementioned agreement with the illegal entity established in the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic which is occupied by the Republic of Armenia constitutes gross and undisguised interference in the internal affairs of the Azerbaijani Republic and yet another infringement of the latter's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and that it violates the universally accepted norms of international law and hence can have no legal force whatsoever.

It is significant that this provocative action was taken during the visit to the region of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Switzerland, Mr. F. Cotti, who has stated that a settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict can be achieved only if the Republic of Armenia recognizes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Azerbaijani Republic.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijani Republic views the actions of the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia as a challenge to the stand taken by the States members of OSCE and as a most flagrant provocation intended to disrupt the efforts of the international community to mediate a peaceful settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM III)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 21 of Security Council resolution 1045 (1996) of 8 February 1996, in which the Council, inter alia, requested me to report by 7 March 1996 on the progress made by the Government of Angola and the União Nacional para a Indepêndencia Total de Angola (UNITA) towards meeting the goals and timetable agreed between them, and to keep the Council fully informed of developments on the ground. The report covers events since my last report dated 31 January 1996 (S/1996/75).

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. During the period under review, a number of foreign dignitaries visited Angola and underscored their strong concern at the slow progress in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol (see S/1994/1441, annex). As a result of these contacts, as well as the efforts of my Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, and the representatives of the three observer States (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America), there has been some movement towards meeting the goals established in the timetable agreed upon by the Government and UNITA in January 1996.

3. Among the positive developments during the past month are a decrease in the number of cease-fire violations; a further reduction in hostile propaganda; the release of additional prisoners registered with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (while the Government has freed all 353 such prisoners held by it, UNITA has so far released 139); the disengagement of government forces from some forward positions; and continued quartering of the rapid reaction police in 3 out of the 10 planned quartering areas. However, the implementation of many other elements is still behind schedule, particularly the crucial quartering of UNITA troops. Delays in this process have affected the implementation of other key provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, including the extension of State administration throughout the country.

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4. The Joint Commission, the principal body charged with monitoring the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, has continued to hold regular meetings under the chairmanship of my Special Representative. The follow-up mechanism set up recently by the Commission to monitor the implementation process at the head-of-delegation level has been operating on a daily basis and has proved to be an effective instrument in persuading the parties to honour their commitments. My Special Representative and the three observer States presented to the Government and UNITA a revised timetable for the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. Following a meeting at Bailundo on 19 February 1996 between UNITA leader Mr. Jonas Savimbi and a high-level government delegation, the Joint Commission approved the timetable on 28 February 1996. The present document describes in detail various tasks the two parties and the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) will have to implement during the month of March, and envisages substantial acceleration of the entire peace process.

5. The fourth meeting between President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi took place on 1 March 1996 at Libreville, Gabon. With regard to military issues, Mr. Savimbi promised to complete the quartering of UNITA troops by June 1996 and both sides agreed to start the process of selection of UNITA troops for incorporation into the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and to complete the formation of the unified armed forces, also by June. They also agreed to form by June or July the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation in which Mr. Savimbi would be a Vice-President. On his part, Mr. Savimbi submitted to President dos Santos a list of officials proposed for the various posts reserved for UNITA in the Government and the administration. It was agreed that the mandate of the current National Assembly would be extended following adequate consultations and that President dos Santos would soon declare an amnesty for offences resulting from the Angolan conflict.

6. There has been no progress towards the establishment of an independent United Nations radio, on which the Security Council has pronounced itself on several occasions. I urge the Government of Angola to resolve this important issue without further delay.

III. MILITARY ASPECTS

A. Observance of the cease-fire

7. During the reporting period, the military situation remained generally calm, except for a few skirmishes, primarily in the provinces of Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul, Benguela and Huila. In the Lundas, most of the reported violations were related to disputes over control of diamond-producing areas; in the Southern Region, many of them resulted from cattle rustling by elements of both the Government and UNITA forces. The number of cease-fire violations dropped considerably towards the end of February. The Armed Conflict Prevention Group, which comprises high-ranking military representatives of the two parties and UNAVEM III, has played an effective role in the investigation and control of cease-fire violations. UNAVEM III has also been encouraging meetings between FAA and UNITA field commanders to build confidence at the local level.

8. The restrictions of movement imposed by UNITA on the personnel of UNAVEM III and other international organizations have been lifted. However, on 6 February, a Bangladeshi engineering team was ambushed, fortunately without casualties, by unidentified individuals in Kwando Kubango Province, and on 18 February, a UNAVEM III staff member and civilian personnel of MECHEM, a South African demining company under contract to the United Nations, were briefly detained by UNITA.

B. Completion of the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces

9. The Government and UNITA continued intensive talks on this issue, which is expected to be resolved by June 1996. Further delays in resolving this problem may have an adverse effect on the quartering process, since many UNITA troops, particularly their officers, are uncertain about their future. In the meantime, the Government has indicated to UNAVEM III that it is planning to begin the integration of UNITA personnel into FAA once their number in the quartering areas reached 20,000 troops.

C. Quartering process

10. The quartering of UNITA troops is essential to successful implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and it is of the greatest importance that it be carried out in good faith and be completed expeditiously. After the adoption of Security Council resolution 1045 (1996), the pace of quartering in the first four assembly areas accelerated, but since the last week of February it has slowed dramatically. As of 1 March, 16,699 UNITA troops had been registered and 13,728 weapons had been surrendered to the United Nations. In the meantime, UNAVEM III has completed the construction of four additional quartering areas capable of accommodating approximately 20,000 soldiers.

11. Despite extensive preparations by UNAVEM III, the rapid influx of thousands of troops to the first four areas created some problems with food supplies, medical assistance and transport. However, the situation in the camps is currently calm and, in cooperation with UNITA commanders, the United Nations has been addressing these logistic issues. But the quartering process continues to be a major logistical challenge for UNAVEM III, with many unexpected difficulties. During the next stage, for example, UNITA will need assistance with transport for its personnel and equipment from their present positions to the quartering areas; this will require additional air and vehicular support from UNAVEM III.

12. Other aspects of the process continue to cause serious concern. Eighty-one individuals brought to the Vila Nova quartering area subsequently left and turned themselves over to the Angolan National Police, claiming that they had been forcibly recruited for quartering. Reports from UNAVEM III teams in Huambo Province confirm that this practice has indeed taken place in some areas. In Kimbele (Northern Region), UNAVEM III discovered a group of juveniles under detention in a UNITA prison; on investigation, it turned out that a local commander had received orders from his superiors to "recruit" young individuals for quartering. UNAVEM III has also observed that some UNITA troops arriving in

quartering areas are below or above the usual age for military service. Another concern of the Mission is that 30 to 40 per cent of the personal weapons collected are in very poor condition or not serviceable. UNAVEM III is actively pursuing these matters, which have a direct bearing on the credibility of the whole process.

13. The staff of the United Nations, its agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the quartering areas continue to provide humanitarian assistance, including medical services, to the family members of soldiers who are quartered nearby, as well as to other vulnerable groups in the neighbourhood. Representatives of United Nations agencies and international NGOs have also been deployed to the four additional quartering areas recently completed.

14. With regard to the withdrawal of the FAA troops to the nearest barracks, which is another important element of the Lusaka agreements, the Government has indicated that it will remove its forces from all the areas where the quartering of UNITA troops has been completed.

D. Demining and road rehabilitation

15. With the improvement of the military situation throughout the country, the United Nations has been able to step up its road rehabilitation and demining activities. In close cooperation with the Central Mine Action Office of the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit and the Angolan Institute for the Removal of Explosive Devices, UNAVEM III has been training over 130 Angolan demining specialists. The graduates of these courses will be regrouped into demining brigades, which will be employed by the Angolan Institute for the Removal of Explosive Devices under the supervision of UNAVEM III. Specialized international NGOs also continue to train Angolan personnel as mine awareness instructors, deminers and supervisors to support road rehabilitation programmes and other humanitarian activities - mainly in the provinces of Bié, Benguela, Huambo, Malange and Kwando Kubango.

16. At the same time, active mine verification is being undertaken by NGOs and UNAVEM III around quartering areas, bridges and some access roads. MECHEM has now verified 682 kilometres of roads and cleared 647 kilometres of roads. As of 1 March, UNAVEM III engineer units had installed and/or reconstructed 10 bridges in various parts of Angola.

E. UNAVEM III strength and deployment

17. The strength of UNAVEM III military and police personnel was 6,539 as of 1 March. With the establishment of two mobile verification teams to monitor the quartering of UNITA troops and the withdrawal of FAA to barracks, UNAVEM III now has a total of 56 observer teams, 33 of which include civilian police observers. The induction of two companies from Zambia and Ukraine of 200 men each, as well as additional logistic elements from Portugal, is expected in March as planned.

IV. POLICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS

18. The activities of the civilian police component (CIVPOL) of UNAVEM III continued to focus on monitoring the neutrality of the Angolan National Police, the general law and order situation, the free circulation of people and the provision of assistance to the Mission's Human Rights Unit. CIVPOL also verified and monitored the quartering of the rapid reaction police, which has so far been conducted in the cities of Luanda, Huambo and Uige. As of 1 March, 2,295 rapid reaction police out of a declared total of 2,444 had been quartered. The Government has indicated its readiness to start barracking the rapid reaction police in several other places, depending on progress in the quartering of UNITA troops. It has also agreed to return to Luanda 220 rapid reaction police recently deployed to Lunda Norte Province. However, it has indicated that the quartering of the rapid reaction police elements stationed in Cabinda will be delayed, since they are providing security for major oil installations there. Since accommodation in many parts of the country is scarce, it will be important to assist the rapid reaction police with the provision of temporary shelter. As an interim measure, I intend to provide them with tents from the United Nations logistic base at Brindisi.

19. The civilian police component has also closely monitored the activities of the Angolan National Police in providing security to UNITA leaders residing in Luanda. A comprehensive security plan still needs to be worked out by the two parties as a matter of priority. It is imperative that UNITA notify the Government without further delay of the personnel it wishes to designate for training as bodyguards and provide a list of its members who will require special security protection.

20. The Government has indicated that, after the completion of the demobilization of UNITA troops, it will begin the disarmament of the civilian population, which is another essential element of the Lusaka Protocol. UNAVEM III has provided the Government with comprehensive proposals in this regard. In view of the deterioration of law and order throughout the country, I urge the Government to initiate the disarmament process as soon as possible.

21. UNAVEM III teamsites continue to report numerous violations of basic human rights in many parts of Angola. United Nations human rights personnel and CIVPOL monitor the situation and investigate complaints presented by the Government and UNITA, as well as by private individuals. UNAVEM III has also finalized a plan of action, for which a special voluntary trust fund will be established, aimed at promoting human rights education. In implementation of this plan, UNAVEM III organized on 27 February a seminar for law enforcement officers in Benguela Province. In the meantime, the European Union has agreed to provide support to a UNAVEM III project, which will be prepared in cooperation with the Centre for Human Rights of the United Nations Secretariat, to train Angolan nationals involved in human rights education.

V. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

22. After a reduction of tension, humanitarian assistance activities, including road convoys and relief flights, returned to normal in January and February. The World Food Programme (WFP) was able to transport over 80 per cent of relief items overland. For the first time, a humanitarian convoy travelled from Huambo to Andulo via Mungo in Bié Province. The opening of this route will facilitate access to the nearby quartering area and to needy populations in the neighbourhood. Thanks to the joint efforts of UNAVEM III, United Nations agencies and NGOs, it is also expected that the Malange-Saurimo-Luena road will be opened soon, allowing relief organizations to reach needy populations in the eastern part of Angola.

23. However, access to many municipalities is still restricted, as a result of bad road conditions, mine pollution and lack of adequate security. In eastern and central Angola, isolated security incidents have led to the temporary suspension of relief activities. In response to reports of food shortages in northern Angola, various relief agencies have started humanitarian operations in that region. Over the past year, the number of NGOs providing health assistance in Uige Province has increased from 2 to 10, but numerous checkpoints maintained by both parties are still hindering relief operations in the area.

24. The United Nations continues to encourage active participation by local officials in various humanitarian activities and the free circulation of people and goods. On 13 February, members of the National Humanitarian Coordination Group, led by the Minister for Social Assistance, attended a meeting of the provincial coordination group in the city of Uige, after which the Minister went to the UNITA-controlled town of Negage to discuss with the Vice-President of UNITA specific measures to foster national reconciliation and free movement of the population. In Huila Province, efforts by United Nations agencies, NGOs and UNAVEM III to promote working relations between government and UNITA officials led to a first meeting between provincial authorities and local UNITA officials. As a result, joint assessment missions are now being sent to vulnerable areas of this province, to be followed by convoys delivering relief supplies.

25. Although nutritional conditions have generally improved, relief agencies continue to identify pockets of malnutrition in the recently accessed areas of Huila, Kwanza Norte and Uige Provinces. Wherever feasible, government and UNITA officials are associated with emergency interventions to address such problems.

26. In the agricultural sector, the initial projections of a good harvest, which were made after the distribution of seeds and tools last November, have proved wrong. Insufficient rainfall portends a severe loss of harvest in various areas, mainly along the coast and in Huambo Province. Humanitarian agencies have recommended the continuation of emergency food distribution in the affected areas.

27. The United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit, in close collaboration with United Nations agencies and NGOs, is preparing the final draft of the 1996 updated appeal for Angola. This appeal reflects the need for resources for emergency assistance, for demining and for the quartering, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants during 1996.

VI. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS

28. On 9 February 1996, the Government approved two projects, which were prepared with the assistance of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), to support the demobilization process. One will provide support to demobilized (including disabled and underage) soldiers, their families and communities, through technical assistance to the Angolan Institute for the Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-Military Personnel, as well as the establishment of Counselling and Referral Services for ex-combatants. Another project, which was formulated with technical assistance from the International Labour Organization (ILO), will provide vocational and on-the-job training for demobilized personnel.

29. Since the round-table conference, held at Brussels on 25 and 26 September 1995, the Government, with support from UNDP, has designed a coordination mechanism aimed at the effective implementation of the Community Rehabilitation and National Reconciliation Programme. According to this plan, donors will provide technical and capacity building support to the Ministry of Planning and to Provincial Planning Offices. In the meantime, nine provinces have been identified for quick establishment of technical units in charge of implementing the programme. In anticipation of its start, a meeting at Luanda between provincial governors and the donor community is planned to be convened shortly. Also, the Government has requested UNDP to begin a review of the existing projects in the area of economic management and to formulate an integrated programme that would include all external assistance programmes. In pursuance of that initiative, a special UNDP mission arrived in Angola on 20 February. This should help to create the conditions for the adoption of the stabilization programme with International Monetary Fund (IMF) support. It is hoped that the exercise will result in the preparation of an economic management capacity-building programme by June 1996.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

30. By extending the mandate of UNAVEM III for three months, the Security Council clearly signalled that, while it was prepared to continue to support the peace process in Angola, the Government and UNITA must demonstrate their commitment to implement the Lusaka Protocol without further delay.

31. Since the adoption of Security Council resolution 1045 (1996), the parties have taken some steps in the right direction. Of particular importance was the long-awaited fourth meeting that took place at Libreville on 1 March between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi. These high-level meetings can play an important role in the promotion of national reconciliation and encourage the steady advance of the peace process. They also set an example for a continuous dialogue at all levels inside the country.

32. While the Government should be commended for the implementation of several of its commitments, UNITA's quartering of more than 16,000 troops was, despite its significant shortcomings, a step forward. But the mandate given to UNAVEM III by the Security Council in its resolution 976 (1995) has already passed its mid-point. Time is running short if the parties are to complete the

numerous outstanding tasks foreseen in the Lusaka Protocol. In recent days, the quartering of UNITA troops has slowed dramatically. Instances of forced recruitment and the substandard quality and quantity of weapons, equipment and ammunition brought to the quartering areas are bound to raise doubts about the good faith of UNITA in its approach to this process. UNITA can dispel these doubts only by completing the quartering in an expeditious and orderly manner in accordance with the new timetable. Failure to do so would test the patience and goodwill of the international community. Equally important are a transparent withdrawal of FAA to barracks and the completion of the quartering of the rapid reaction police.

33. At the same time, rapid conclusion of the talks on all outstanding military matters is critical for the advancement of the peace process. The Government must intensify practical preparations for the integration of UNITA personnel into FAA and administrative and governmental structures. Confidence between the parties must be reinforced by the release of all prisoners held by UNITA, unrestricted circulation of people throughout Angola, the launching of a country-wide campaign to disarm civilians, the transformation of UNITA into a political party and the effective implementation of other aspects of the Lusaka Protocol.

34. The humanitarian crisis in Angola is far from over and, as I have stressed in previous reports, there is still need for massive emergency assistance. I wish to take this opportunity to reiterate my appreciation to the donor community for its generous contributions to programmes that alleviate the suffering of the Angolan people. At the same time, the task of socio-economic rehabilitation and reconstruction is yet to begin. Moreover, the success of all these efforts depends on the establishment of genuine peace and national reconciliation, a goal that can only be achieved through the full commitment of the Government and UNITA to honour their obligations under the Lusaka Protocol.

Annex

UNAVEM III - Military and civilian police personnel
(as of 1 March 1996)

Country	Military observers	Civilian police officers	Staff officers	Troops	Total
Algeria	8	--	--	--	8
Bangladesh	10	21	21	200	252
Brazil	20	9	38	867	934 a/
Bulgaria	9	15	--	--	24
Congo	8	--	--	--	8
Egypt	10	15	--	--	25
Fiji	--	10	--	--	10
France	8	--	12 b/	--	20
Guinea-Bissau	20	--	--	--	20
Hungary	10	8	--	--	18
India	20	13	49	1 014	1 096
Italy	--	--	4 b/	--	4
Jordan	20	21	--	--	41
Kenya	10	--	--	--	10
Malaysia	20	20	--	--	40
Mali	10	15	--	--	25
Namibia	--	--	--	200	200
Netherlands	16	8	8 b/	--	32
New Zealand	6	--	9 b/	--	15
Nigeria	21	20	--	--	41
Norway	5	--	--	--	5
Pakistan	5	--	7 b/	--	12
Poland	5	--	--	--	5
Portugal	9	11	20	241	281
Republic of South Korea	--	--	6	198	204
Romania	--	--	26	859	885

Country	Military observers	Civilian police officers	Staff officers	Troops	Total
Russian Federation	13	--	--	160	173
Senegal	10	--	--	--	10
Slovakia	5	--	--	--	5
Sweden	20	10	--	--	30
Ukraine	5	--	--	9	14
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	--	--	2	--	2
United Republic of Tanzania	--	3	--	--	3
Uruguay	10	12	42	800	864
Zambia	19	15	12	295	341
Zimbabwe	23	22	45	800	890
Total	355	248	301	5 643	6 547

a/ The contingent is undergoing a major rotation.

b/ Military specialists in the UNAVEM III demining school.



Map No. 3881 Rev. 9 UNITED NATIONS
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6 March 1996
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LETTER DATED 4 MARCH 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to inform you that, some time ago, we submitted to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 748 (1992) a request to be allowed to purchase, for use in cases of emergency medical evacuation in the place of one of the other approved aircraft (a Corvette SN 601), a JetStar L-329/731 with sufficient fuel capacity for seven hours of flight and thus capable of reaching all of the destinations approved by the Committee. Regrettably, however, the Committee informed us by its communication S/AC.28/1996/OC.14 that it was unable to grant this request.

Of the Libyan medical evacuation service's four approved aircraft, two are front-line aircraft and two are support aircraft. One of the front-line aircraft, a 1976 Corvette SN 601, is out of service because it is in need of maintenance. It is also not capable of reaching a city like Bonn, for example, because it has sufficient fuel capacity for only three and a half hours of flight and thus no safety margin without a technical stopover. The other front-line aircraft is a 1968 JetStar L-329, and it has recently been serviced. It is the only aircraft currently making medical evacuation flights. The two 1979 Beechcraft BE-200 aircraft approved by the Committee as support aircraft are not in use because they are in need of maintenance. They require five and a half hours to reach Bonn. These four aircraft perform humanitarian medical evacuations, within and outside the Jamahiriya and for both Libyan nationals and foreigners, carrying patients and seriously injured victims of road accidents and natural disasters. As we have indicated, three of them are out of service for lack of essential spare parts, which are supposed to be exempt from the provisions of resolution 748 (1992) for humanitarian reasons, and because of their advanced age and constant need of maintenance.

The only aircraft that is operational is the JetStar L-329. It is capable of flying 1,300 air miles, and it makes long-range non-stop flights despite the fact that the international air safety code urges that sufficient fuel should be carried from the point of departure to enable an aircraft to reach its point of arrival with sufficient fuel on board to continue to an alternate airfield should it be unable to land at its original destination and for 45 minutes on hold over its destination for such unforeseen reasons as airport closure or

inclement weather. Given these parameters, it is not possible for the three other aircraft approved by the Committee to make direct medical evacuation flights without a stopover at an intermediate airport if the international air safety code is to be observed. This hinders the Libyan medical evacuation service in the performance of its humanitarian functions.

We should like you to bring this matter to the attention of the Security Council with a view to securing its approval for the purchase of the aircraft in question for use in medical evacuations, given that there is a pressing need for it in order to save the lives of Libyans and of non-Libyans present in the country.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohamed A. AZWAI
Permanent Representative

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7 March 1996

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LETTER DATED 5 MARCH 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 1035 (1996) of 21 December 1995 and my report of 13 December 1995 (S/1995/1031) concerning the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH).

I wish to inform you of my intention to deploy five military liaison officers to UNMIBH in order to strengthen the liaison arrangements between that Mission and the multinational implementation force (IFOR). The military liaison officers would report to my Special Representative and Coordinator of United Nations Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Iqbal Riza, and assist him in the discharge of his responsibilities.

I should be grateful if you could bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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7 March 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 MARCH 1996 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 5 March 1996 (S/1996/173) concerning your intention to deploy five military liaison officers to the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They agree with the proposal contained in your letter.

(Signed) Legwaila Joseph LEGWAILA
President of the Security Council

96-05659 (E) 070396 080396

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S/1996/175
7 March 1996

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LETTER DATED 6 MARCH 1996 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF ANGOLA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you the press communiqué of the last meeting between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi at Libreville, Gabon, dated 1 March 1996.

I kindly request that this communiqué be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Josefa CRUZ
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

96-05716 (E) 070396 080396

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Annex

Press communiqué issued at Libreville on 1 March 1996

1. On 1 March 1996, a meeting took place in Libreville, Gabon, between the President of the Republic of Angola, His Excellency Jose Eduardo dos Santos, and the President of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), His Excellency Jonas M. Savimbi, under the auspices of His Excellency El Hadj Omar Bongo, President of the Republic of Gabon. The objective of the meeting was to make an assessment of the status of the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.

2. The meeting was held amid a climate of total understanding and cordiality. They discussed in detail recent developments regarding the Angolan peace process and its current issues, and reviewed the commitments made in previous meetings, particularly in the Franceville meeting. They also made a statement about the immediate future of the country.

3. As a result of these discussions, they decided to adopt a series of measures to accelerate the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, in order to achieve real peace and national reconciliation as well as stability in the country.

4. Therefore, they agreed to conclude the process of the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces by June 1996, and to form a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation between June and July 1996. To that effect, UNITA submitted a list with the names of its officials.

5. It was agreed that the next meeting between the President of the Republic and the President of UNITA would take place in Angola, keeping in mind, however, the willingness of the Republic of Gabon in hosting future meetings.

6. The President of the Republic of Angola and the President of UNITA expressed their appreciation for the efforts made by the United Nations in the person of His Excellency Mr. Alioun Blondin Beye, Special Representative of the Secretary-General; by the troika of countries observers of the peace process; and by the international community in general, towards reconciliation and stability in Angola.

7. The President of the Republic of Angola and the President of UNITA expressed their deep gratitude to the President of the Republic of Gabon for his hospitality and his permanent willingness to assist them, providing the material and technical means that made this meeting successful.

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Security Council

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S/1996/176
7 March 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 MARCH 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached communication dated 1 March 1996 addressed to me by His Excellency Dr. Anastase Gasana, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Rwanda.

I should be grateful if you would bring the letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

96-05686 (E) 070396 080396

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Annex

Letter dated 1 March 1996 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Rwanda addressed to the Secretary-General

THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA'S PROPOSAL FOR CONTINUED UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE TO NATIONAL RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION OF THE COUNTRY

In the 1994 genocide, over 1 million people were brutally murdered. Each village in Rwanda was affected with about 4 million people internally displaced and 2.5 million refugees lured into exile by the perpetrators of genocide.

The tragedy has left a big problem of orphans, widows and other helpless people who survived death but have hardly any means of survival. The national wealth, including money in banks, was looted and both the physical and economic infrastructures were completely destroyed.

The Government of Rwanda has stopped genocide and restored relative peace and security, but it is still confronted with the enormous task of rebuilding a nation shattered by genocide. Given the fact that Rwanda lacks adequate resources, the Government appeals to the international community to mobilize both bilaterally and multilaterally, and particularly through the United Nations system, for the recovery and rehabilitation of post-genocide Rwanda.

Office of the Secretary-General's Special Representative

With the end of the peace-keeping mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) on 8 March 1996, there will still be a need to meet specific post-genocide peace-building requirements and for undertaking rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country, for which United Nations agencies should increase their assistance to the Rwandan Government. Furthermore, upon UNAMIR's departure, United Nations agencies will need to strengthen their collaboration in order to benefit from common services on a cost-effective basis, so that the bulk of their assistance can benefit Rwanda directly.

In order to coordinate the United Nations assistance to the national recovery and rehabilitation of the country, the Rwandan Government accepts the proposal of the United Nations Secretary-General to maintain the office of the Special Representative in Kigali for a period of six months. In addition to coordinating all United Nations activities, the Special Representative should monitor political developments and use his good offices to support the promotion of peace and national reconciliation.

Appropriate United Nations agencies, in addition to those already present in Rwanda such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) etc. should concentrate their common initiatives in the following areas of activities:

1. Repatriation of refugees;

2. Resettlement of returnees and internally displaced persons;

3. Support for the survivors of genocide;

4. Justice and human rights;

5. Improvement of detention centres;

6. Institutional capacity building;

7. Infrastructure rehabilitation;

8. National reconciliation.

A trust fund for rehabilitation and reconstruction should be pursued as a mechanism for the donor countries to contribute resources to enable the Government and United Nations agencies to undertake these recovery and rehabilitation activities, but should make the disbursement of required funds easy.

A. Repatriation of refugees

Repatriating all Rwandese nationals would promote the process of national reconciliation. The Government is committed to the unconditional return of all Rwandan nationals to the country. Bilateral and multilateral agreements have been reached between the Government of Rwanda and the Governments of neighbouring countries on the repatriation mechanism.

The Government has translated its commitment to the return of refugees through the following actions:

1. Advocacy for national reconciliation;

2. Restoration of security within our borders;

3. Discouraging revenge through enforcement of law and order;

4. Promoting a culture of transparency by, for example, allowing human rights monitors throughout the country;

5. Enforcement of laws governing property rights;

6. Resettlement and reintegration of returnees in both the administration and the army and in other social structures.

These measures have already led to the return of 2,272,000 in only one year. UNHCR has played an instrumental role in the conclusion of repatriation agreements with neighbouring countries and should continue to be the lead agency during the repatriation process. Resources should be made available so that

UNHCR could continue to coordinate and cooperate closely on that matter with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the World Food Programme (WFP).

B. Resettlement of returnees and internally displaced persons

During the Thematic Consultation on Refugees held at Kigali in November 1995, the Government of Rwanda presented to the international community a plan of action for the repatriation, resettlement and social reinsertion of refugees and internally displaced persons.

This plan of action indicates priority actions which are estimated to cost $131 million over the next three years to resettle and offer support for the socio-economic reintegration of all refugees coming back to the country and internally displaced persons.

The Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration will continue to require support from UNDP to strengthen its capacities to support, coordinate and monitor the implementation of the plan of action at the national and prefectoral level. UNDP, through the various specialized agencies of the United Nations, such as the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) (UNCHS) and the United Nations Office for Project Services, should continue to support resettlement and social reintegration in, respectively, urban areas and rural areas. UNHCR will be expected to facilitate first stage resettlement through the provision of reinstallation kits and shelter material.

C. Support for the survivors of genocide

The genocide of 1994 left hundreds of thousands of people, such as handicapped, widows, orphans or unaccompanied children, elderly, etc. in Rwanda in deplorable living conditions. These vulnerable groups could be assisted by UNICEF, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), UNCHS and the World Food Programme (WFP), who will develop in close collaboration with the Government as well as international and local non-governmental organizations, targeted assistance projects and programmes to reduce the vulnerability of these groups.

D. Human rights and justice

1. International Tribunal for Rwanda

The Government of Rwanda recognizes the complementarity of the mandate of the International Tribunal for Rwanda to its own action to bring to justice the Rwandese presumed guilty of acts of genocide and will continue to support its work in the country. The Secretary-General should continue to mobilize both human and financial resources for the tribunal so that it can accomplish its task.

2. Monitoring of human rights situation

The Government of Rwanda recognizes the importance of the monitoring of the human rights situation in the country as a factor contributing to the establishment of a climate of confidence. The United Nations Human Rights Operation in Rwanda will thus continue to monitor the human rights situation in the country, carry out investigations on acts of genocide for the International Tribunal for Rwanda and promote post-conflict confidence-building.

3. Rehabilitation of the judiciary and improvement of detention conditions

The rehabilitation of the judiciary is one of the main priorities of the Government of Rwanda and it will continue to need the assistance of the international community in order to support its proper functioning over the years to come. UNDP and its executing agency in that sector, the United Nations Department for Development Support and Management Services, will be requested to continue to provide assistance to strengthen national capacity and support the coordination of external assistance in that sector.

Following the tragic events of 1994 during which thousands of criminals participated in the genocide of up to 1 million persons, large numbers of Rwandese are currently in custody. Detention conditions in Rwanda have been largely recognized as being below human standards and should be radically improved. The United Nations Department for Humanitarian Affairs will be requested to continue to bring to the attention of the international community the need for their support to improve the detention conditions. UNDP, in collaboration with the Government, will continue the implementation of the rehabilitation work.

E. Human security

1. Internal security

The Government of Rwanda has already started to reorganize and strengthen its gendarmerie and communal police and has expressed its intention to proceed to the demobilization of part of its army. UNDP will continue to provide support to the strengthening of Rwandese gendarmerie and communal police, particularly in the areas of training and non-lethal equipment, and the World Bank will support the preparation and implementation, in collaboration with other agencies such as IOM and UNICEF, of a comprehensive demobilization and social reinsertion programme.

F. Trust Fund for rehabilitation and reconstruction of Rwanda

It is suggested that financing of the above-mentioned activities be provided by bilateral and multilateral donors through the expanded Trust Fund for rehabilitation and reconstruction of Rwanda. All funds contributed will be managed by a committee composed of representatives of the Rwandese Government, bilateral and multilateral donors and United Nations agencies. UNDP will assure the secretariat of the committee and will report to donors on the use of the funds.

The Government of Rwanda takes this opportunity to renew its commitment to the principles and ideals of the United Nations, and wishes to express its great appreciation for the sacrifices and contributions UNAMIR personnel have made during their tenure in Rwanda.

(Signed) Anastase GASANA
Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Cooperation

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1996/177
8 March 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) of 29 February 1996 (S/1996/149),

Welcoming the letter of 1 March 1996 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Rwanda to the Secretary-General (S/1996/176, annex),

Paying tribute to the work of UNAMIR and to the personnel who have served in it,

Stressing the continued importance of the voluntary and safe repatriation of Rwandan refugees and of genuine national reconciliation,

Emphasizing the importance it attaches to the role and responsibility of the Government of Rwanda in promoting a climate of confidence, security and trust and the safe return of Rwandan refugees,

Emphasizing also the importance it attaches to States acting in accordance with the recommendations adopted by the Regional Conference on Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons held in Bujumbura in February 1995, the Summit of Heads of States of the Great Lakes region held in Cairo on 28-29 November 1995, and the follow-up conference of 29 February 1996 held in Addis Ababa, and the importance it attaches to the continuation of efforts to convene a regional conference for peace, security and development in the Great Lakes region,

Encouraging all States to cooperate fully with the International Commission on Inquiry established by resolution 1013 (1995) of 7 September 1995,

Recognizing the importance of the Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda in contributing to the establishment of confidence in the country, and concerned that it may not be possible to maintain its presence throughout Rwanda unless sufficient funds for that purpose are secured in the very near future,

Concerned also to ensure the effective operation of the International Tribunal for Rwanda established by resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994,

Commending the continuing efforts of the Government of Rwanda to maintain peace and security as well as to reconstruct and rehabilitate the country,

Stressing its concern that the United Nations should continue to play an active role in assisting the Government of Rwanda in promoting the return of refugees, in consolidating a climate of confidence and stability and in promoting the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Rwanda,

Reiterating the responsibility of the Government of Rwanda for the safety and security of all United Nations personnel and other international staff serving in the country,

1. Takes note of the arrangements made by the Secretary-General for the withdrawal, starting on 9 March 1996, of UNAMIR pursuant to its resolution 1029 (1995) of 12 December 1995;

2. Authorizes elements of UNAMIR remaining in Rwanda prior to their final withdrawal to contribute, with the agreement of the Government of Rwanda, to the protection of the personnel and premises of the International Tribunal for Rwanda;

3. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to submit recommendations to the General Assembly regarding UNAMIR non-lethal equipment that may be released for use in Rwanda in accordance with paragraph 7 of its resolution 1029 (1995) and calls upon the Government of Rwanda to take all necessary steps to ensure that UNAMIR personnel, and equipment which is not remaining in Rwanda, can be withdrawn without impediment and in an orderly and safe manner;

4. Encourages the Secretary-General, in agreement with the Government of Rwanda, to maintain in Rwanda a United Nations office, to be headed by his Special Representative and to include the present United Nations communications system and radio station, for the purpose of supporting the efforts of the Government of Rwanda to promote national reconciliation, strengthen the judicial system, facilitate the return of refugees and rehabilitate the country's infrastructure, and of coordinating the United Nations efforts to that end;

5. Commends the efforts of States, including neighbouring States, the United Nations and its agencies, the European Union and non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons, and underlines the importance it attaches to continued efforts by the Government of Rwanda, neighbouring States, the international community and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to facilitate the early, safe, voluntary and organized return of Rwandan refugees to their own country in accordance with the recommendations of the Bujumbura conference;

6. Calls upon States and organizations to continue to give assistance for the reconstruction of Rwanda and the rehabilitation of the infrastructure of the country, including the Rwandan justice system, directly or through the United

Nations trust funds for Rwanda, and invites the Secretary-General to consider whether there is a need to adjust the scope and purposes of those funds to bring them into line with current requirements;

7. Calls also upon States to contribute urgently to the costs of the Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda, and encourages the Secretary-General to consider what steps might be taken to place the Operation on a more secure financial basis;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 5 April 1996 on what arrangements have been agreed with the Government of Rwanda for the protection of the personnel and premises of the International Tribunal for Rwanda after the withdrawal of UNAMIR and on the arrangements he has made pursuant to paragraph 4 above, and to keep the Council closely informed thereafter of developments in the situation;

9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

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S/1996/178
7 March 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 MARCH 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ITALY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On behalf of the European Union I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a declaration of the Presidency of the European Union on the independent media in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

I would be grateful if you could have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) F. Paolo FULCI

96-05722 (E) 070396 080396

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Annex

[Original: English and French]

Declaration of the presidency on behalf of the European Union on the independent media in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Rome, 6 March 1996. The European Union is gravely concerned about the recent decision which has led to the loss of independence of television station "Studio B" in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as about the rumours of imminent negative measures against other independent information sources in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It is also strongly concerned for the recent withdrawal of the registration of the Soros Yugoslavia Foundation in Belgrade.

It deems that such initiatives are not consistent with the commitments undertaken by the Belgrade Government in the framework of the process of pacification and stabilization in the area, which imply behaviours respectful of democratic standards.

The Union underlines the great importance it attaches to the consolidation of democratic principles in all the countries of former Yugoslavia and, in this context, to the freedom of independent media, which is a basic element of a really democratic society.

Such an important aspect will have its weight in the development of future relations between the European Union and the countries of the area.

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S/1996/179
11 March 1996

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1044 (1996)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In its resolution 1044 (1996) of 31 January 1996, the Security Council called, in paragraph 4 (a), on the Government of the Sudan to "undertake immediate action to extradite to Ethiopia for prosecution the three suspects sheltering in the Sudan and wanted in connection with the assassination attempt" on President Mubarak "on the basis of the 1964 Extradition Treaty between Ethiopia and the Sudan".

2. In paragraph 4 (b) of the same resolution, the Council called on the Sudan to "desist from engaging in activities of assisting, supporting and facilitating terrorist activities and from giving shelter and sanctuary to terrorist elements and act in its relations with its neighbours and with others in full conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and with the Charter of the Organization of African Unity".

3. In paragraph 7 of resolution 1044 (1996), the Council requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to seek the cooperation of the Government of the Sudan in the implementation of that resolution and to report to the Council within 60 days.

4. On 6 February 1996, I informed the Council of my decision to send my Special Adviser, Under-Secretary-General Chinmaya R. Gharekhan, as my Special Envoy to the area to conduct the requisite consultations and gather relevant information to carry out the mandate entrusted to me (S/1996/92). My decision was welcomed and supported by the Council in a letter addressed to me by the President on 8 February 1996 (S/1996/93).

II. MY SPECIAL ENVOY'S MISSION

5. In the course of his mission, which lasted from 18 February to 2 March 1996, my Special Envoy held consultations with the Secretary-General of OAU at its headquarters in Addis Ababa and met with the authorities in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, the Sudan, Egypt and Tunisia.

Consultations with OAU

6. My Special Envoy met on 19 February 1996 with the Secretary-General of OAU Salim Ahmed Salim. Also present at the meeting was the OAU Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Daniel Antonio, who had led two OAU missions to the Sudan in pursuance of the mandate given by the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. My Special Envoy underlined that resolution 1044 (1996) expressed the Security Council's firm support for OAU in its continued efforts to implement its decisions.

7. Mr. Salim noted that the main focus of the OAU efforts, and of its two missions to the Sudan (in November/December 1995 and February 1996), was the complaint of Ethiopia about the Sudan's lack of compliance with the extradition request for the three suspects in the assassination attempt on President Mubarak. The larger issue addressed in paragraph 4 (b) of resolution 1044 (1996) was of undoubted concern to OAU, but for the present, OAU was concentrating on tackling the aftermath of the assassination attempt, which was seen as an attack against OAU itself. The two OAU missions had held extensive meetings with the authorities in the Sudan, but the fact remained that the three suspects had still not been extradited to Ethiopia. The Sudan was insisting that it needed more information from Ethiopia and Egypt about the suspects. The view of both Ethiopia and Egypt was that the Sudan had all the information it needed and knew very well where the three suspects were. OAU appreciated the support of the United Nations and its Secretary-General in its efforts and hoped for close consultations and cooperation.

8. Since his return to New York, my Special Envoy has been in contact with the Secretary-General of OAU. Mr. Salim has informed him that the question of what further action he might take in the matter is under his consideration.

Consultations with the Sudan's neighbours and others

9. In Ethiopia, my Special Envoy was received by the Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Seyoum Mesfin. They emphasized that the attempt on the life of President Mubarak was not merely a bilateral dispute with the Sudan but had a regional and international dimension. It was only after failing to obtain the Sudan's cooperation in resolving the matter bilaterally or in the forum of OAU that Ethiopia had decided to take it to the Security Council. They expressed their satisfaction at the prompt handling of the matter by the Council and the Secretary-General. Ethiopia recognized that paragraph 4 (a) of resolution 1044 (1996) relating to the assassination attempt and the wider issues addressed in paragraph 4 (b) were inseparable; however, Ethiopia's focus was on the efforts to see the three suspects in the assassination attempt brought to justice in Ethiopia. In this context, they provided my Special Envoy with an in-depth briefing on the events following the assassination attempt on President Mubarak, based mainly on the facts already made available to the Security Council in the letter dated 9 January 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the President of the Council (S/1996/10). The competent Ethiopian organs had established conclusive evidence against the three suspects and had furnished all the necessary information about them to the Sudanese authorities. Ethiopia had

overwhelming material and human evidence, which could not be divulged for reasons of security, that the Sudanese authorities knew about the whereabouts of the suspects and that requests by the Sudan for additional information were merely delaying tactics. All that was required was the necessary political will on the part of the Sudan to extradite the suspects to Ethiopia. Once the suspects had been arrested by the Sudan, Ethiopia would consider submitting additional information if it was needed to speed up judicial procedures for extradition.

10. The Ethiopian authorities recalled that the initial response of the Sudan to the extradition request had not been discouraging, in the sense that it had not made any attempt to prove that the suspects were not in the Sudan. Ethiopia was given to understand that the Sudanese authorities had needed more time to enable them to take necessary action. However, Ethiopia had established all the facts after thorough investigation and the Prime Minister had sent a letter to the President of the Sudan asking for the extradition of the suspects. The Sudan had confined itself to reshuffling some personnel in its security services and replacing the Minister of the Interior. The Sudan continued to evade the fundamental issue, namely, the extradition request. Extradition by the Sudan of the suspects would send a clear signal to terrorists that they were not welcome in the Sudan.

11. Ethiopia was keen to re-establish friendly relations with the Sudan and the Sudanese Government's refusal to surrender the suspects was the only major problem in the relations between the two countries. Extradition of the suspects would also send a message to other neighbours of the Sudan that the Sudan had broken with the terrorist elements on its territory and stopped its support for their activities.

12. In Eritrea, my Special Envoy was received by the President, Isaias Afwerki, on 22 February 1996. President Afwerki pointed out that Eritrea had been the target of subversion and destabilizing acts supported by the Sudan for several years. Eritrea had compiled a comprehensive report on that question in late 1993 after all bilateral efforts at solving the problem had been exhausted. The persons involved had mainly been recruited by the Khartoum Government and the National Islamic Front in Eritrean refugee camps in the Sudan. Since 1993, Eritrea had captured documents and other evidence of involvement by terrorists belonging to other Arab and Muslim nationalities who were commonly referred to as "Afghanis" because of their participation in the mujahedin war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The President recalled Eritrea's letter to the Security Council of 15 January 1994 (S/1994/34) in this connection. The reaction of the international community until now had been disappointing and Eritrea had been obliged to deal on its own with the threat posed by the Sudan. Diplomatic efforts, culminating in an Ethiopian-sponsored meeting in July 1994 of the leaders of the Sudan and Eritrea, had failed. Eritrea had then cut its relations with the Sudan and was determined to use any means to defend itself against violations of the international law and the norms of international behaviour by the Sudan. Unfortunately, it had taken the assassination attempt on President Mubarak to create the necessary awareness among the international community of the seriousness of the Sudanese policies. However, President Afwerki emphasized, that specific terrorist act, which he condemned, should not distract attention from the more general threat posed by the Sudanese policy of

destabilization and subversion that affected millions in the region. He hoped that the Security Council would take determined measures against the Sudan in the event of non-compliance with resolution 1044 (1996).

13. In Uganda, my Special Envoy was received by the Prime Minister, Kintu Musoke, on 23 February 1996. In the Prime Minister's view, the present tensions between the Sudan and other States of the region had their root cause in the internal problems of the Sudan, specifically in the religious and ethnic division between the north and the south of that country. Even the assassination attempt on President Mubarak was a culmination of that internal conflict in Sudan. He expressed his Government's support for resolution 1044 (1996) and wished to see it implemented. He said that the Sudan was supporting two Ugandan rebel movements with a view to destabilizing the Government by arming and training them as well as by providing bases for their activities. The two rebel movements were the Lord's Resistance Army and the West Nile Bank Front. Uganda had captured rebel fighters who had admitted that they were operating from bases in the Sudan. The Sudan was recruiting refugees and sending them back to Uganda to destabilize the border region. The Prime Minister cited a series of cross-border incursions that had taken place with increasing frequency in the second half of 1995. As for the Sudan's allegations that Uganda was supporting the rebel movement in the Sudan, he categorically rejected them. He pointed out that the conflict in the Sudan had started long before the present Government had come to power in Uganda. He also recalled that, between 1990 and 1994, Uganda had permitted Sudanese monitoring teams on its border with the Sudan. In all the four years, these monitors had not found a single incident of Ugandan supplies or other support for the rebels in southern Sudan.

14. In Egypt, my Special Envoy met with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Amre Moussa, on 29 February 1996 and also held detailed discussions with the responsible senior officers in the Foreign Ministry. The Egyptian authorities emphasized to my Special Envoy that the attempt on the life of President Mubarak was not a bilateral dispute between Egypt and the Sudan or even between Ethiopia and the Sudan; it was aimed at undermining the entire region and indeed the continent of Africa.

15. Egypt had nothing but goodwill for the people of the Sudan. However, the regime in Khartoum was engaged in activities of promoting and supporting terrorism in neighbouring countries, posing a threat to the stability of the neighbours. The Egyptian authorities pointed out that, during the last six to eight months, there had been an upsurge in terrorist acts in southern Egypt, in the region adjacent to the Sudan. Arms caches had been found and all indications pointed to the Sudan as the source of the arms.

16. As far as the three suspects were concerned, Egypt had no doubt whatever, based on investigations carried out by Ethiopian authorities, that they were in the Sudan and that the Sudanese authorities had all the necessary information about them. Details about the sources of such information could not be divulged for reasons of confidentiality. The Sudan was obliged to comply with the demands of the Security Council contained in its resolution 1044 (1996).

17. In Tunisia, my Special Envoy was received by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Habib Ben Yahia, and Minister of the Interior, Mohamed Jeghan, on 1 and 2 March 1996, respectively. They related that Tunisia had been confronted by religious extremism and terrorism in the early 1990s. Terrorists active in Tunisia had been provided with Sudanese passports, and material and technical devices to build bombs had been smuggled into the country by staff of the Sudanese Embassy in Tunis. Tunisia had also detailed evidence, which was confidential, of training camps for terrorists in the Sudan. These activities by the Sudan had ultimately led to the breaking of diplomatic relations with the Sudan. The Sudan's activities to destabilize Tunisia had diminished since 1992, mainly because of vigilant police work and a policy of social and economic progress. There were, however, still some 10 Tunisian terrorists who had fled to Europe in the early 1990s and who had received and were still receiving support from the Sudan. Some of them had been provided with Sudanese passports. Although Tunisia was not currently suffering from Sudanese-sponsored terrorism, other countries were, and to overcome the terrorist threat completely, international cooperation was needed. Tunisia hoped that, in the wake of resolution 1044 (1996), more thought would be given by the international community on how to confront terrorism globally.

Consultations with the Government of the Sudan

18. In the Sudan, my Special Envoy was received by the President, Omar Al-Bashir, on 27 February, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ali Osman Taha, on 25 February, the Minister of the Interior, Bakri Hassan Salih on 26 February, and the Minister of Justice, Abdel Aziz Shido on 27 February and the Director of Public Prosecution who is heading the special committee set up by the Sudan to follow up on the Ethiopian extradition request, also on 27 February 1996. He also had a meeting with Salahuddin Ghazi, Secretary-General of the National Congress of the Sudan.

19. In his discussions with the Sudanese leadership, my Special Envoy conveyed the sense of urgency and seriousness with which the Security Council had considered the entire matter and which was reflected in resolution 1044 (1996). He emphasized that both subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 4 of the resolution were of great importance to the Security Council.

20. All the Sudanese interlocutors described Security Council resolution 1044 (1996) as unfair, unjust and unbalanced. They complained that the Council had completely ignored the facts as presented by the Sudan in arriving at its decision. Whereas OAU, in its decision taken in December 1995, had asked the Sudan to look for, locate and then extradite the three suspects, the Security Council had based its resolution on the assumption that the suspects were in the Sudan and that the Sudan knew where they were. The Sudan, however, had no idea about the whereabouts of the suspects. The Sudan had even requested assistance from the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) which, on 15 February 1996, had informed the Sudanese Government that it did not have any information about the matter. The Sudanese authorities repeatedly complained about Ethiopia's delay of 32 days in providing all the relevant information. Even the information that had been belatedly supplied by Ethiopia was extremely sketchy and inadequate. The Minister of the Interior stated that the Sudan could possibly be more successful in its efforts to locate the suspects provided

it received full cooperation from the relevant Ethiopian and Egyptian agencies and provided the matter was treated as a criminal case; he added that, if the case was treated as a political issue, all efforts of the Sudan would be in vain.

21. The Minister of Justice of the Sudan, who is also the Attorney General of the country, maintained that the Sudan was in fact complying with paragraph 4 of resolution 1044 (1996) since under it the Sudan was called upon to comply without further delay with the request of OAU. He pointed out that the OAU request was to look for, locate and then extradite the suspects and that was exactly what the Sudanese authorities had been doing. My Special Envoy pointed out that the demand of the Security Council was for the Sudan to undertake immediate action to extradite the suspects to Ethiopia.

22. Similarly, the Sudanese authorities maintained to my Special Envoy that the allegations regarding the Sudan's support for terrorist activities in the neighbouring countries were unfair and unfounded. On the contrary, it was the Sudan that was the victim of destabilization and aggression from its neighbours. The Sudan had written letters to the President of the Security Council complaining about the aggression committed against it by Eritrea (S/1995/522), Egypt (S/1995/616) and Ethiopia (S/1996/29), which had remained unanswered.

23. The President of the Sudan told my Special Envoy that Security Council resolution 1044 (1996) had put the Sudan in a very difficult situation. It had already punished the Sudan by vitiating the investment environment in the country and had caused a sharp decline in the value of the currency. Whereas OAU asked the Sudan to look for the suspects, the Council had assumed that the Sudan knew their location and had asked the Sudan to extradite them to Ethiopia. Despite this unfounded assumption, the President assured my Special Envoy that his Government was responding to resolution 1044 (1996) in a very serious manner. The competent Sudanese authorities had provided my Special Envoy with detailed briefings on the measures taken by the Sudan to locate the suspects. In particular, the Sudan had started to register all Egyptians living in the country; the directorates of police in all states of the Sudan had been provided with all the information available for the search of the suspects; visa requirements had been reintroduced for citizens of Arab countries with effect from August 1995; all persons leaving the Sudan were thoroughly checked with special attention being paid to false passports; a financial incentive had been offered for information leading to the arrest of the suspects; and the available information had been widely disseminated throughout the country through media and posters in public places.

24. Regarding allegations of support by the Sudan in harbouring and encouraging terrorist activities in neighbouring countries, President Al-Bashir described them as totally unfair. In reality, the President said, it was the Sudan that suffered from destabilization by its neighbours. He maintained that Egypt was occupying Sudanese territory in the Halaib area and that Sudanese troops were surrounded and killed by Egypt. He referred to "open military support" offered by the President of Eritrea for anyone willing to topple the Sudanese Government by violent means. (The Sudanese authorities handed over to my Special Envoy a video purporting to establish Eritrea's active support of the Sudanese dissidents.) The President added that the Eritrean Government, in an

unprecedented act, had offered the Sudanese Embassy in Asmara to the Sudanese opposition groups. Ethiopia was similarly engaged in destabilizing practices and had committed acts of aggression at five locations on the border, using tanks and artillery. As for Uganda, the President said that it had been closely involved with the Sudanese rebels over the past four years, whom it had supplied with tanks, artillery and rocket launchers. The Sudan was not in the least involved in supporting terrorism in neighbouring countries.

25. President Al-Bashir suggested to my Special Envoy that he might pay another visit to the Sudan to continue the consultations. He proposed that the Secretary-General might send a separate military fact-finding mission, which could look into the allegations about the Sudan maintaining terrorist training camps. The fact-finding mission could also verify the Sudan's complaints of aggressive actions committed against it by Ethiopia and Egypt.

III. OBSERVATIONS

26. In its resolution 1044 (1996), the Security Council addressed two demands to the Government of the Sudan, namely, to extradite to Ethiopia the three suspects wanted in connection with the assassination attempt on President Mubarak; and to desist from engaging in activities of assisting, supporting and facilitating terrorist activities and from giving shelter and sanctuary to terrorist elements.

27. With regard to the three suspects, the Government of the Sudan has not yet complied with the demand of the Council. As is evident from the present report, there are basic differences between the Government of the Sudan and the Government of Ethiopia on this matter. The Ethiopian Government is convinced beyond doubt that the Sudan is sheltering the suspects. The Ethiopian authorities have reached this conclusion after extensive investigations as well as on the basis of information gathered from interviews with three of the criminals involved in the assassination attempt who are in the custody of the competent Ethiopian agencies. The Ethiopian Government is understandably anxious to protect the confidentiality of its sources of information and reluctant to reveal them.

28. The Sudanese Government, for its part, maintains that the Ethiopian Government has not provided it with adequate information on which to base its search for the suspects. Furthermore, even this sketchy information was received from Ethiopia after a lapse of 32 days. In spite of these handicaps, the Sudanese authorities assured my Special Envoy that they were continuing with their efforts to look for the suspects. In case they succeeded in apprehending the suspects, the Government of the Sudan would have no difficulty whatever in extraditing them to Ethiopia.

29. Similar differences prevail as regards the second demand of the Security Council contained in paragraph 4 (b) of resolution 1044 (1996). All the neighbouring countries visited by my Special Envoy - Ethiopia, Eritrea, Egypt and Uganda - are unanimous in their conviction that the Sudan is actively engaged in supporting terrorist elements who operate from Sudanese territory, carrying out destabilizing activities in their countries. They affirm that they

have conclusive evidence of the Sudan's involvement in such terrorist activities but were not willing to reveal it for reasons of security and confidentiality. The Government of Eritrea had prepared a comprehensive report on the subject, the substance of which had been communicated to the Security Council in document S/1994/34. The Governments of the neighbouring countries also affirmed that the Sudan was running camps for training terrorists. The Government of Tunisia told my Special Envoy that the Sudan, until about two years ago, was actively supporting some Tunisian dissidents, furnishing them with sabotage equipment and even, in some cases, giving them Sudanese passports. It is obvious that the neighbouring countries are seriously concerned about all these activities undertaken by the Sudan.

30. The position of the Sudan on paragraph 4 (b) of resolution 1044 (1996) is that it is the Sudan that is the victim of destabilizing activities encouraged and supported by its neighbours. The Sudanese interlocutors with whom my Special Envoy met in Khartoum told him about heavy equipment, including tanks and anti-aircraft guns, which had recently been observed in the south and which, according to them, could only have come through Uganda. Similarly they referred to the activities of the Sudanese rebels who are alleged to be operating from Eritrean territory with the active and public support of the Eritrean Government. As for Ethiopia, the Sudanese authorities complained to my Special Envoy about attacks launched by Ethiopian forces on five different places on its border with the Sudan. Regarding Egypt, the Sudanese Government maintained that it was Egypt that had illegally occupied Sudanese territory in Halaib.

31. In view of the situation as described above, it is obvious that the Sudan has not yet complied with the demand of the Security Council to extradite the three suspects to Ethiopia and that all the neighbours of the Sudan, visited by my Special Envoy, have accused the Sudan of supporting terrorist activities within their territories.

32. It is my intention to keep in close contact with all parties concerned as well as with the Secretary-General of OAU on all aspects of resolution 1044 (1996). I shall keep the Security Council informed on all relevant developments relating to this difficult situation.

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1038 (1996)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. By paragraph 1 of its resolution 1038 (1996) of 15 January 1996, the Security Council decided to authorize the United Nations military observers to continue monitoring the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula for a period of three months, to be extended for an additional period of three months upon a report by the Secretary-General that such extension would continue to contribute to the decrease of tension there.

2. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of the same resolution, by which the Council requested me to submit by 15 March 1996 a report for its early consideration on the situation in the Prevlaka peninsula as well as on progress made by the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) towards a settlement that would resolve their differences peacefully, and on the possibility that the existing mandate might be extended or that another international organization might assume the task of monitoring the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula.

3. In my report pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1025 (1995) and 1026 (1995), I stated my intention to maintain 28 United Nations military observers in the Prevlaka area, under the command and direction of a chief military observer, who would report directly to United Nations Headquarters in New York (S/1996/83). The mission would be known as the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP).

4. The United Nations military observer operation in Prevlaka has become a separate mission under the command of Colonel Goran Gunnarsson of Sweden. UNMOP has continued to carry out daily patrols and to conduct regular weekly meetings with local military and police commanders in Dubrovnik and Herceg-Novi. The Chief Military Observer and his Deputy have also attended meetings at a higher level with political, religious and cultural leaders in the area and with general staff officers in Zagreb and Belgrade in order to promote confidence and improve the prospects for a solution.

II. THE SITUATION IN THE PREVLAKA PENINSULA

5. In July 1992, I had informed the Council that, with the assumption of responsibility by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs), the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) was required to withdraw from all other areas in Croatia (S/24353). While some withdrawal took place following the arrival of UNPROFOR, JNA forces continued to remain in the Dubrovnik area despite repeated efforts by UNPROFOR to secure their withdrawal. In meetings with the Belgrade authorities, the then Force Commander, Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, had been informed that, in view of the strategic importance of the Prevlaka peninsula east of Dubrovnik, which controls the entrance to the Gulf of Kotor, the JNA withdrawal would be contingent on the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula and on a guarantee that Croatian heavy weapons would not be located in proximity to it. As indicated in paragraph 11 of my report to the Council of 27 July 1992 (S/24353), the Belgrade authorities requested an UNPROFOR presence in the area to ensure its demilitarization until the case they had submitted to the European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia on the delineation of State borders in this area was resolved as part of an overall political settlement, or until a decision was taken on the matter by the International Court of Justice.

6. In my report of 28 September 1992 (S/24600), I noted that, following subsequent discussions conducted by UNPROFOR on this matter, a proposal elaborated by UNPROFOR was finally accepted by both sides. Under this agreement, the Yugoslav Army (as the JNA was by then called) would withdraw completely from Croatia, Prevlaka would be demilitarized and heavy weapons would be removed from neighbouring areas of Croatia and Montenegro. The agreement was based on the concept of the establishment of a demilitarized zone on either side of the Croatian/Montenegro border (a "blue zone") and an area free of heavy weapons and fortifications ("yellow zone"). Implementation of the agreement would be monitored by UNPROFOR and/or the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM). The Security Council, by its resolution 779 (1992) of 6 October 1992, authorized UNPROFOR to assume responsibility for monitoring the arrangements agreed upon for the Prevlaka peninsula. By a letter of 21 October 1992 (S/24710), I advised the Council that the Yugoslav Army had completed its withdrawal from all Croatian territory in compliance with the plan approved by the Council, and UNPROFOR military observers were stationed on the Prevlaka peninsula, where the United Nations flag was flying.

7. At present, although the situation in the Prevlaka peninsula remains stable, there continue to be provocations from both sides. UNMOP monitoring of the Prevlaka demilitarized zone has been seriously disrupted because of a number of violations within the "blue zone" - an area intended to be controlled exclusively by the United Nations and to which both parties were to be denied access. Within this area, four positions have been permanently manned and one position intermittently manned by Croatian special police forces. These positions have been developed as military-type fortifications with emplacements that are suitable for the positioning of tanks and other heavy weapons. Access by UNMOs to Croatian positions has been consistently denied, limiting the ability of the observers to monitor the area in accordance with their mandate. In addition, the laying of mines in two areas on the Croatian side has threatened the safety and seriously restricted the movement of the military

observers. On the Montenegrin side, a special police check-point has been permanently manned since October 1994. Montenegrin authorities have maintained that this check-point was established in retaliation for the erection of a Croatian check-point at Cipavica in September 1994.

8. Both parties continue to dispute the nature and extent of the yellow zone and to construct field defence fortifications within it. In general these fortifications consist of mutually supporting strong points with overhead protection sited in depth. The stronger positions contain a number of bunkers with wide fields of fire, accommodation bays and, in some cases, mortar-firing positions. Minefields are marked as having been laid in front of the forward positions. Some of the positions are occupied by special police and others are unmanned. Both sides are present in the northern part of the yellow zone. On the Croatian side, military units have been positioned in the Dubravka area and the presence of tanks, artillery and anti-aircraft guns has been reported by United Nations military observers. With the permanent restriction of movement in one area on the Montenegrin side, the dispositions of Yugoslav forces are uncertain. However, UNMOP believes that significant elements are present.

III. PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT

9. Prior to his departure from the mission area, my Special Representative, Mr. Kofi Annan, visited Prevlaka and held discussions with President Bulatovic of the Republic of Montenegro, President Milosevic of the Republic of Serbia and President Tudjman of the Republic of Croatia. In a meeting with my Special Representative on 1 March 1996, President Tudjman maintained that, historically, Prevlaka had been Croatian territory and that there was no question of disputing Croatia's sovereignty, changes of borders or territorial negotiations. None the less Croatia was ready to discuss with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) all aspects concerning Prevlaka and had presented a number of proposals for decreasing tension and solving the issue through bilateral negotiations.

10. In the course of a meeting between my Special Representative and President Milosevic of Serbia on 28 February 1996, the latter indicated that Prevlaka remained the only unresolved bilateral issue with Croatia. However, the Serbian side was prepared to work on a "bridging" solution that would facilitate normal, but not fully normalized, relations with Croatia. In a meeting with Mr. Annan on 27 February 1996, President Bulatovic of Montenegro stated that he was committed to a negotiated settlement but that, pending that settlement, the status quo should be maintained. Montenegro was intending to respond to a set of Croatian proposals on Prevlaka and was ready to talk constructively about proposals for joint infrastructure development and expansion of the potential for tourism.

11. While all the parties appear committed to a peaceful solution of the Prevlaka issue, they differ on which international organization should monitor the peninsula pending such a solution. Croatian officials have expressed their preference for a mission under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in order to remove the impression, which they believe is created by the United Nations presence, that the area is disputed and

under the threat of military confrontation. President Bulatovic has indicated that OSCE monitoring of the area is not acceptable as long as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) does not have full membership in that organization. Both Presidents Bulatovic and Milosevic have expressed satisfaction with the present UNMOP mandate and have appealed for its renewal while negotiations with Croatia are continuing. In discussions with OSCE officials, my Special Representative was informed that OSCE would not be in a position to accept responsibility for monitoring the demilitarization of the peninsula in the near future.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

12. The Prevlaka peninsula remains a tense but stable area of potential military confrontation between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). However, all parties have expressed their desire to resolve their differences peacefully by negotiation. The negotiation process has accelerated over the past few months with both sides considering practical confidence-building measures that would decrease tension and allow the full economic and tourist potential of the area to be realized. The parties agree that the presence of international observers is an important reassurance, which contributes to the decrease of tension and to a more positive atmosphere for negotiations, but they do not agree on which organization should perform this task.

13. It is essential that the parties improve cooperation with UNMOP if the Mission is to monitor the demilitarization agreement effectively. Of particular concern are the violations in the blue zone, which have been steadily increasing in recent months. While there are no indications of hostile military action in the area at the present time, I am concerned that, if these violations are allowed to remain unchecked, they could lead to an increase in tension and possible conflict in the area.

14. In the absence of further progress between the parties on a negotiated resolution of their differences, and in the absence of agreement between them on an alternative organization to monitor the area, I consider that the continued presence of UNMOP will contribute to the decrease of tension there.

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Items 71 (g) and 72 (c) of
the preliminary list*
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT:
REGIONAL DISARMAMENT
REVIEW AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE
TWELFTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY: REGIONAL
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 11 March 1996 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you a copy of the official communiqué by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador issued on 6 March 1996, which describes in detail the ceremony conducted on that date in Brasilia, in which the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Luis Felipe Lampreia, presented the Ambassadors of Ecuador and Peru with the lists of the remaining impasses, which each of their respective countries submitted to the other.

This ceremony was held in accordance with the agreement reached in Quito on 23 February by Foreign Ministers Galo Leoro and Francisco Tudela, within the framework of the process to normalize relations between Ecuador and Peru.

I should be most grateful if this letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 71 (g) and 72 (c) of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Emilio IZQUIERDO
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/51/50.

ANNEX

Official communiqué issued in Quito on 6 March 1996

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs stated that today, 6 March 1996, at 1530 hours Brazilian time (1330 hours Ecuadorian time), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Ambassador Luis Felipe Lampreia, handed to the Ambassadors of Ecuador and Peru, in the presence of the Ambassadors of the Guarantor Countries accredited to Brazil, sealed envelopes containing the lists of the remaining impasses, which were delivered in Quito once the requirements set forth in agreement of 23 February 1996 were fulfilled.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs indicated that the document submitted by Ecuador stated the following:

"Remaining impasses: the list of the "remaining impasses", which the Government of Ecuador is submitting in order to draw up, together with the list to be submitted by the Government of Peru, the complete list of the impasses which will be the subject of the negotiations under point 6 of the Itamaraty Peace Declaration of 17 February 1995:

1. The partial impossibility of implementing the Protocol of Rio de Janeiro owing to the lack of a watershed between the Zamora and Santiago rivers;

. Free and sovereign Ecuadorian access to the Marañón-Amazonas area.

2. Demarcation problems:

(a) The Cuzumaza-Bumbuiza/Yaupi sector;

(b) The Lagartococha-Güepi sector.

3. Problems arising from division of rivers according to geodesic lines. The problem in the Napo river, Yasuni-Aguarico sector.

4. The Zarumilla channel.

(Signed) Galo LEORO F.
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Quito, 23 February 1996"

The Ecuadorian Embassy in Brasilia has transmitted the list of impasses submitted by Peru, the text of which reads as follows:

"Aide-mémoire. Disagreements concerning the border demarcation. For Peru, as Ecuador knows, the expression 'a lasting solution to the remaining impasses' means completing the demarcation of the borderline laid down in article eight of the Protocol of Peace, Friendship and Boundaries, signed

in Rio de Janeiro on 29 January 1942, in accordance with its additional instruments and the verdict by the Brazilian arbitrator, Sea and War Captain Braz Dias de Aguiiar.

For Peru, there are two sectors on the borderline where there are demarcation impasses:

1. In the Lagartococha sector:

The headwaters of the Lagartococha river and the Güepi river

2. In the Cordillera del Cóndor sector:

(a) Between the Cunhuime Sur boundary marker, point 'D' referred to in the Diaz de Aguiiar verdict (in the Cordillera del Cóndor at the point of the 'divortium aquarum' between the Zamora and Santiago rivers where the mountain spur appears and the '20 November' boundary marker;

(b) Between the Cuzumaza-Bumbuiza boundary marker and the confluence of the Yaupi and Santiago rivers.

(Signed) Francisco TUDELA
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru"

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador considers that the presentation of the lists of impasses constitutes an important step providing the two countries with the material for the negotiations to be carried out, which will be conducted in the future in Brazil. The list of the Ecuadorian impasses represents a position continually held by Ecuador, which is in keeping with the need to bring about, on the basis of a just solution, a real and effective breakthrough to achieve lasting peace and understanding, which must lead to positive benefits for the two peoples.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly stated that the future negotiations will be complex and difficult. Nevertheless, it is confident that there will be the necessary understanding making it possible to bring the divergent positions of the two countries closer together and that, with the assistance of the Guarantors, a just and final solution to the Ecuadorian-Peruvian territorial problem will be achieved.

Lastly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Foreign Minister Lampreia expressed, during the ceremony of the presentation of the lists in Brasilia, the satisfaction of the Guarantor Countries, and of Brazil in particular, with the progress made in the peace process to achieve a final settlement of the Ecuadorian-Peruvian conflict and also once again offered the assistance and cooperation of the Guarantors in order to make headway in that process.